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Is There a Right to Surrogacy?
CHRISTINE STRAEHLE
ABSTRACT Access to surrogacy is often cast in the language of rights. Here, I examine what
form such a right could take. I distinguish between surrogacy as a right to assisted procreation,
and surrogacy as a contractual right. I find the first interpretation implausible: it would give rise
to claims against the state that no state can fulfil, namely the provision of sufficient surrogates
to satisfy the need. Instead, I argue that the right to surrogacy can only be plausibly understood
as a contractual right. I then investigate two different sets of harms that are often employed to
argue against such a contractual interpretation of the right to surrogacy: (1) harm to women’s
interests in a gendered society, and (2) harm to the sense of self of the surrogate. I assess both of
these through the analytical lens of vulnerability. I find neither of them to be convincing
arguments against surrogacy contracts. In conclusion, I agree that surrogacy contracts should be
carefully regulated, but I disagree with those who call for prohibition of the right to surrogacy as
a contractual right.
1. Introduction
Many different aspects of our lives are now subjected to a language of rights. But of
course, we need to wonder if ‘[it is] reasonable or even intelligible to claim a right to
something that is impossible’, as Mary Warnock writes.1 The right to have a family and
biological children seemed for many infertile couples such an unintelligible right until
the advent of artificial reproductive technologies (ART) like IVF. Thanks to such
technologies, many can now realise their wish for biological children. Nevertheless, there
are still some for whom ART do not help realise their goal of having their own children.
But, as Warnock asks, ‘does it make sense in all circumstances to claim a right to
reproduce?’2 This question is particularly relevant in the context of surrogacy, i.e. the
context in which a woman is commissioned to have the fertilised egg provided by a
commissioning couple implanted in her womb for her to carry to term. Such gestational
surrogacy, which is to say surrogacy in which the surrogate has no genetic ties to the
foetus, is available to all hopeful couples, and the procedure may give children to
otherwise childless couples.3 Considering these obvious benefits, should we accept that
there is a right to surrogacy?
Here a distinction may be in order. Rights as I construe them here can be assessed
according to what interests they aim to protect, and what claims they may entitle its
holders to make.4 In a second step, these claims may be divided into two different
categories: on the one hand, some rights give rise to positive claims against others, and
often the state, to help realise the right in question; on the other hand, some rights simply
entitle their holder to negative claims against others, which is to say that the rights-holder
can claim not to be interfered with when exercising the right. It should also be noted that
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it is not the case that important interests always warrant positive claims; at least in some
interpretations, all that is needed is the absence of interference for the interest to be
protected. In other words, claims need to be assessed from a perspective of the imple-
mentation of the right. When assessing the claims a right may generate, we need to ask
what is necessary for the realisation and protection of the interest at stake.To illustrate,
think of the right to individual autonomy that many liberals hold dear, and which will be
important for my assessment of the right to surrogacy. Some commentators argue that
the interest at stake is to be able to shape our lives as much as possible according to our
own choices.5 Now, some argue that the claim resulting from a right to individual
autonomy is simply to be free from undue interference, what we normally refer to as the
postulate of negative freedom.6 Others, however, argue that negative freedom is not
sufficient to effectively realise the interest of individual autonomy — instead, the state
needs to provide us with a set of options amongst which we may choose, and which alone
will enable us to take the kinds of decisions that characterise autonomous living.7
A right to surrogacy may be understood as aiming to protect two different interests,
and generating two different sets of claims. In the next section, I will discuss surrogacy
as a right to assisted procreation. I will argue that a right to surrogacy as a procreative right
cannot be defended. I reach this conclusion not because I doubt that surrogacy is
procreation. This is to say that I accept that surrogacy arrangements can help couples
realise their interest in having and rearing biological children. I also believe it fair to say
that this is an interest worth protecting. Instead, I want to show that the argument for a
right to surrogacy as a procreative right fails because of the claims the right-holders may
have towards others, and the state in particular. It would prove impossible to effectively
realise a right to surrogacy as a procreative right simply because we don’t have any way
of assuring that hopeful commissioning parents would find women willing to work as
surrogates. The claim that would derive from a right to surrogacy as a procreative right
would therefore be implausible. Moreover, as I argue in Section 3, consent to work as a
surrogate is highly controversial, especially in cases of international surrogacy, which is
the context I am concerned with here.
Section 3 begins with an assessment of the right to surrogacy as a contractual right. Here
I argue that individual women should have the right to employ their bodies for repro-
ductive labour. In order to realise the interests this interpretation of the right to surro-
gacy aims to protect, namely that of contractual freedom, the state’s obligation is simply
to frame surrogacy in contractual law, thereby stipulating what forms surrogacy con-
tracts can take. In particular, such contracts need to assure that surrogates in interna-
tional contexts are not vulnerable to being harmed when engaging is such work.
Moreover, commissioning couples also have obligations towards the child after birth.
These latter obligations are not due to the specific conditions under which they become
parents, however — rather, they are due to the kind of limits and obligations we impose
on parents in society.
To consider the right to surrogacy as a contractual right rather than as a procreative
right opens the way to a critical assessment of possible limits that may be imposed on
such a right.This is to say that, while I accept surrogacy as a contractual right that may
be a means for commissioning parents and women working as surrogates to realise
important goals in their lives, the interest at the basis of such a right — namely,
contractual freedom — may weigh less heavily than the interest to procreate. In this
instance, the right to surrogacy is a right that needs to be balanced and weighed against
2 Christine Straehle
© Society for Applied Philosophy, 2015
other considerations. Put differently yet again, an interpretation of the right to surrogacy
as a right to enter contractual agreements may allow for restrictions to the right to
surrogacy — it is not a trump. Restrictions may be justified with conflicting interests or
potential harms an unfettered exercise of the right may bear. In Section 3, I will discuss
two sets of harms that have been mobilised against surrogacy as a contractual right: the
harm to a surrogate’s interests in a gendered society; and the harm to the surrogate’s
sense of self. I reject them as unconvincing restrictions against a right to surrogacy as a
contractual right, proposing instead that such contracts need to be regulated rather than
prohibited.
2. Surrogacy as a Right to Assisted Procreation
A right to surrogacy as a right to assisted reproduction could be proposed in the first
instance with the aim to protect the interest of a couple to have children. Some have
plausibly argued that the ability to have children and parent them provides individuals
with uniquely valuable opportunities to realise themselves and their deeply held goals in
life.8 If we accept the argument made in the context of ART, namely that we usually
accept the interest of individuals to have children and create a family,9 then we may
accept that those who don’t respond to such treatments or those for whom such
treatment options are not helpful need to have access to a right to surrogacy in order to
realise this interest.We may convince ourselves that gay couples or couples with medical
conditions prohibiting pregnancy will only be able to realise their fundamental interest
in procreation if they have access to surrogacy.
Some could argue of course that the interest in a right to have children does not suffice
to motivate a right to surrogacy since such an interest could be satisfied by means of
adoption. The interest the right to surrogacy as a right to assisted procreation aims to
protect, however, is the interest to have biological children. This specific interest may be
prompted by different motivations: for some, adoption in the current legal and interna-
tional context is not feasible or too lengthy a process. Others may fear that an adopted
child may have special needs that they as future parents won’t be able to satisfy, or they
may fear that they lack the intuition and understanding necessary to care for an adopted
child, believing instead that a shared genetic heritage may make it easier to face the
challenges childrearing may bring. Suffice to say that, in support of a right to surrogacy,
we can’t simply assume adoption to be as good an option for all hopeful parents as the
option of having biological children.10
On a more positive note, some may have good reasons to hope for biological children.
Anna may love some of her partner’s character traits so much that she may hope to have
a child with similar features. Or she may hope to recreate together with her partner some
of the features that are prevalent in their families. Other hopeful parents may simply
desire to continue life in the lives of their children, a kind of perspective that gives the
parents’ lives meaning and sense.11 Most dramatically, of course, some parents may wish
for biological children because they hope to thereby find a donor of a renewable organ
for another, ill child.12 In general we don’t question people’s motivation to have biologi-
cal children, even though we may very well think that we should, from an ethical
perspective.13
If we accept that many people have an interest in creating and rearing biological
children, to what claim should a right protecting this interest give place? Many would
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argue that the healthcare services in developed states should provide couples with the
possibility to have children if this were possible. In this vein, many states have accepted
a responsibility to provide ART for couples who have trouble conceiving without assis-
tance. The argument, then, is that to have access to a family, some persons may need
medical intervention. If we accept that it is a basic interest of individuals to have children
and create a family, and if the state can help realise this interest, then it should be easy
to accept, also, that the state has a responsibility to help those of its members who cannot
realise this basic interest without help.14 To be sure, IVF and other medical interventions
are only advocated within the boundaries of the reasonable — Ontario, for instance, has
recently accepted to fund only one cycle of IVF for couples who suffer from infertility of
all kinds15 — but the principled part of the argument suggests that the state may have a
responsibility to help individuals realise one of their important goals in life, which is to
have biological children.16 The argument for such claims is similar to those supporting
many other services provided by the state — it underlines the state’s responsibility to
enable individuals to lead autonomous lives centred and organised on defensible self-
chosen goals and projects. In this view, to procreate is a project individuals have and
cherish, and societies that value the individual projects of their citizens should help
realise them.17 Many gay rights activists have therefore argued that surrogacy should be
considered a reproductive gay right since it is the only possibility for them to have
biological children.18
Oftentimes, however, the same states that support ART also prohibit commercial
surrogacy.19 One way to justify prohibition may be to say that commissioning surrogacy
is not actually an exercise of a procreative right. Instead, some argue that surrogacy is
baby-selling20 or, in the case of commissioning parents, baby-buying. But while we may
believe that part of surrogacy comes close to a trade in babies, this can’t be the whole
story. After all, and certainly in the case of gestational surrogacies, the commissioning
parents are those who bring about the existence of the child.This is to say that they are
those who need to count as the ‘causal’, ‘genetic’ and ‘intentional’ parents;21 commis-
sioning parents have intended and caused for the child to come into being, by providing
their genetic material and by commissioning a surrogate to accept to carry the child to
term. I am not addressing the question here of how we should think about the different
sources for rights and responsibilities that parenthood may bear.22 Instead, what is
important for my purposes is that surrogacy is at least not only baby-selling; it also needs
to count as an act of procreation. Commissioning parents must count as parents.This is
the case even if we may debate to what extent the surrogate should also count as a
parent.23 By this account, then, commissioning parents are simply exercising their
procreative rights to become parents by engaging in surrogacy agreements. To prohibit
surrogacy as simply baby-selling fails, on this account, since engaging in surrogacy has
to count as least in part as the exercise of parental procreation.
So far, then, I have argued that surrogacy should be considered as a means that helps
realise the fundamental interests individuals may have in creating and parenting biologi-
cal children. In this sense, we can say that to consider surrogacy as a right to assisted
procreation may be warranted. Recall, however, that I stipulated earlier that rights need
to be divided into the interests they aim to protect, and the claims they entitle individual
rights-holders to make.
To assess whether or not there is a right to surrogacy, then, we must not only consider
the interest-based argument for a right to procreate. We must also include the claims
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aspect of such a right into our assessment. I will discuss the kinds of possible claims that
surrogacy as a right to assisted procreation may bring forth. Even if we accept that the
right to surrogacy aims to protect individual interests in creating and having biological
children, we may still wonder if we should also accept that such an interest is weighty
enough to justify the right to the services of a surrogate. Put differently, even if we accept
that there is a right to procreate and that surrogacy can help realise this right, we
nevertheless may ask if there is a right to procreate outside our own body? If there was
such a right, commissioning parents or those who would want to become such, may have
a strong claim towards the state to help realise their right. I want to argue that such a
claim may prove to be implausible.
Some critics of surrogacy foresee a potential futuristic world akin to that described by
Margaret Atwood in her novel A Handmaid’s Tale, in which some women of a future
country are designated as living incubators. Such may be the consequences of a right to
surrogacy as a right to assisted procreation, if we were to accept the right to procreate
beyond our own body, or so some fear.24 I don’t believe that this is an actual danger in
liberal-democratic societies: after all, surrogacy as a right to assisted procreation would
only be justifiable because of the protection it provides to goals of autonomous members
of society. Such a society is necessarily wedded to ideas of individual autonomy for all of
its members. To satisfy the conditions of autonomy, individuals have to consent to their
employment in society. It thus seems far-fetched that in such a society, the goal of
protecting the individual interests of some would give license to neglect concern for
those of others.25
Even without such bleak prospects, though, A Handmaid’s Tale does point to an
important reason why we should resist a right to surrogacy as a right to assisted
procreation. Assuming that all those having an interest in procreation as a vital part of
their life, but lacking the means to realise this interest without the help from a surrogate,
would qualify to be holders of the right to surrogacy.What kind of claims could plausibly
ensue? The negative claim, obviously, would demand that surrogacy not be prohibited
within the borders of the state. Moreover, it may necessitate that IVF treatment and
implantation of the surrogate be provided and facilitated by the state. But none of these
provisions would effectively protect the interest of hopeful parents if they lack a surrogate.
A right to surrogacy as assisted reproduction becomes meaningless without the provision
of women who are willing to work as surrogates.
Now, to be sure, we can imagine different initiatives the state could adopt to facilitate
surrogacy: it could promote and encourage such work, either through an official payment
scheme, through official agencies, and other incentives that may motivate a woman to
work as a surrogate. All of these initiatives might be successful in generating interest in
this line of work; but crucially, it is not certain that these would successfully provide
every hopeful commissioning couple with a willing surrogate. We would not be able to
satisfy the claims that a right to surrogacy as a right to assisted reproduction raises.26
In this instance, therefore, surrogacy is not a continuation of the right to ART; instead,
surrogacy is comparable to organ donation. Despite recent arguments that the state
should compensate those of its members who have the bad luck of being in need of an
organ transplant, that the state should therefore pursue a policy of redistributive justice
to compensate for such bad luck,27 the inviolability of bodily integrity is a cardinal value
of liberal democratic states. We simply can’t legislate that people donate or sell their
organs in sufficient numbers to satisfy the need for transplantable organs. We can of
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course speculate that by opening up markets in organs, we might achieve where calls for
voluntary donations have failed. We may also believe that we should at least open the
market for the increased numbers of organ transplants we might thus generate.28 Never-
theless, we can’t be certain that we could provide even a portion of the organs needed.
Similarly with a right to surrogacy: we simply can’t be certain that sufficient numbers
of women would sign up to work as surrogates, even if it was highly remunerated,
provided extensive benefits, and was socially sanctioned. More importantly, claims
against the state fail in this respect since liberal democratic states don’t have this kind of
jurisdiction over individual bodies.29 Put differently, even if there were sufficient
numbers of women willing to work as surrogates, states can’t legislate the right to
surrogacy as a right to assisted procreation, since they can’t legislate the disposal of
individual bodies. This remains the domain of individual autonomy and consent.
We are reminded at this point ofWarnock’s question: to what extent is it intelligible to
‘claim a right to what is impossible’?The impossibility in the case of surrogacy is not that
the technology would not work, or that the realisation of the right is in principle
unfeasible, as may be the case with a right to life, medically understood. Instead, a right
to surrogacy as a right to assisted procreation is unintelligible because it is impossible to
promise the effective protection of the interest at stake, where the protection requires the
collaboration and consent of a third party.
A right to surrogacy for the commissioning parents can therefore not take a positive
form.This is to say that a right to surrogacy can’t be plausibly understood as a claim right
against the state to help realise the interest of having biological children. Instead, a right
to surrogacy can only plausibly take the negative form that, in principle, nothing should
stand between the hopeful parents and a hopeful surrogate if both are willing to enter into
a contractual agreement for reproductive labour. Put otherwise, a right to surrogacy can
only take the form of a right to enter surrogacy contracts. Just below, I will consider
whether the contractual right to surrogacy I now propose is based on a general right to
freedom of contract, or if its justification depends on the specific interest it aims to protect.
3. A Right to Surrogacy as a Contractual Right
Conceiving of surrogacy as a contractual right protects a different set of interests from
the ones discussed so far. Instead of the interest of hopeful parents to realise a funda-
mental value of their life by creating and rearing biological children, a right to surrogacy
as a contractual right simply protects the interests of the contractual parties involved to
enter a contract freely. The nature of the contract is one of employment: both parties
enter the contract on the assumption that the prospective surrogate agrees to engage in
reproductive labour on behalf of the commissioning parents.30 In exchange, the latter
agree to compensate the surrogate for her labour. The nature of the contract as an
employment contract implies that compensation is not owed for other reasons — it does
not compensate the surrogate for relinquishing parental rights, for example, nor is it a
priori a contract that compensates the surrogate for adhering to the demands of the
commissioning parents, even though some conditions of employment can include a set
of behaviours stipulated in order to best protect the well-being of the foetus. Such
requirements are not necessarily unduly arduous on the surrogate. A readily accepted
analogy may be stipulations for police officer to abstain from alcohol while on duty, in
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order to ensure their own wellbeing, and that of those in their care. I don’t take
prescriptions that contractually determine how best to perform surrogacy reproductive
work to be immediately problematic from an autonomy perspective. I will return later on
to discuss specific conditions of the contract that may prove more problematic.
I accept that freedom of contract is an important interest to be protected by the
liberal democratic state. However, we can’t assess the scope of the right to freedom of
contract independently of the interests such a right aims to protect, and without
assessing the relationship between the interest at stake and the need for protection
through freedom of contract. To illustrate, most of us would probably hesitate to
wholeheartedly endorse the right to freedom of contract for purposes of cannibalism.
We would at least hesitate even if a plausible case can be made that an important
interest — to enjoy the right to bodily self-determination — may be as much at stake
in cannibalism contracts as in surrogacy contracts. Freedom of contract is a liberty
right most clearly when without such freedom, the interest it aims to protect can’t be
realised. Without freedom to enter into surrogacy contracts, we can say that some
couples won’t be able to realise their interests in biological children. Once the interests
at stake become less dependent on contractual freedom, I believe that freedom of
contract as a liberty right weighs less heavily. If we can show that the right to bodily
self-determination can be realised without demanding strong protection of freedom of
contract, then I think it plausible to say that we can justify some restrictions to the
right to freedom of contract.31
If this conditionality of freedom of contract as a liberty right is accepted, and if we also
accept the important distinction between surrogacy as a right to assisted procreation, on
the one hand, and surrogacy as a contractual right, on the other, then I believe we can
say, at least in principle, that the right to surrogacy that I advocate here can and may be
legitimately circumscribed. Possible limits are often justified by the kind of harms that
such contracts can provoke. I will now turn to a discussion of some kinds of harm that
surrogacy as a contractual right may bear, and how a consideration of these should weigh
in our assessment of surrogacy contracts. I will argue that the harms proposed are not
convincing arguments against surrogacy as a contractual right. Instead, I will conclude
that only a concern for the wellbeing of the future child can justify restrictions to
surrogacy contracts.To my mind, however, these restrictions are not tied to the fact that
children come into the world as a result of surrogacy — instead, they are justified by a
concern about who should be a parent.
Women may choose to work as surrogates for diverse reasons. Most importantly for
my purposes here, they may choose to work as surrogates in order to be able to realise
some important goals in their lives.These may include the desire to provide for their own
biological children. We now have many different accounts of the kinds of motivations
women have to engage in reproductive surrogacy labour.32 So far, I have taken it for
granted that women should be free to determine how to employ their bodies — in fact,
the argument for bodily integrity and autonomy in how to employ our bodies was at the
basis of my rejection of surrogacy as a procreative right in Section 2.There I argued that
the state has no jurisdiction over women’s bodies and how they should employ them,
since liberal democratic states believe that such decisions should be left to each individ-
ual, subject to the usual caveat of inflicting harm to others.
What should we think of governments, then, that prohibit women from choosing
reproductive labour as a surrogate?Why, in other words, is there asymmetry between the
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value we bestow on individual bodily self-determination that prevents us from ordering
women to work as surrogates, on the one hand, and paternalism when it comes to
surrogacy work, on the other? The arguments against surrogacy as a contractual right
that should be enjoyed by surrogate mothers and hopeful parents most often starts from
potential harms that may ensue from exercising the right over our own body. I will
discuss two of these: (1) the harm that can come to women surrogates in the context of
gender inequality; (2) the harm that surrogacy is assumed to cause to a surrogate’s sense
of self. I will analyse these through the lens of vulnerability.
The perspective of vulnerability when assessing surrogacy contracts is helpful from
a moral perspective, and for several reasons. First, there is a strong moral intuition that
we have a responsibility to protect the vulnerable. Bob Goodin, for instance, argues
that ‘we bear special responsibility for protecting those who are particularly vulnerable
to us’;33 in particular, we ought to protect those whose interests we can easily harm,
those ‘whose vital interests are particularly vulnerable to our actions and choices.’34
Goodin’s account of the vulnerability of others and our obligations towards them
assumes that ‘[o]ne is always vulnerable to particular agents with respect to particular
sorts of threats.’35 Vulnerability is thus essentially a ‘relational notion’ that designates
relationships of dependence. Moreover, vulnerability according to Goodin ascribes
moral obligations to those who have ‘the capacity to produce consequences that matter
to another,’36 and where these consequences affect the interests of another. This
account of vulnerability cautions us against creating conditions of vulnerability for
another. We have moral obligations to attend to those who are vulnerable to our
actions, but we have furthermore an obligation not to create vulnerability in others.
Applied to the case of surrogacy, the lens of vulnerability posits that if it were the case
that surrogacy contracts created vulnerability — and I will be concerned with the
vulnerability of surrogates in particular — then an assessment from a vulnerability
perspective and the moral obligations that flow from it would demand that, indeed, we
prohibit surrogacy contracts. Put differently, the harm of vulnerability would weigh
heavily against the interest in contractual freedom the contractual partners may have.
The interests of surrogates not to be vulnerable ought to outweigh the interest of
contractual freedom.
(1) Vulnerability to Harm in the Context of a Gendered Division of Society
According to Debra Satz, the gender context in which surrogacy is brought about should
play an important role in our assessment of surrogacy contracts.37 By signing a contract,
the surrogate hands over some control over her own body to somebody else for an
extended period of time, namely the period of pregnancy.38 According to standard
surrogacy contracts, a surrogate accepts medical intervention for the sake of impregna-
tion. She further agrees to regular medical examinations, a dietary regime and daily
schedule if she resides in a surrogacy clinic, that most often includes extended periods
of rest. In some cases, surrogacy contracts stipulate further the kind of delivery method
when the foetus comes to term — very often by C-sections — or in what cases the foetus
will be aborted.We can agree that the extent of a surrogate’s control over her own body
depends largely on the terms of the contract she agrees to.
Handing over control over one’s own body occurs in other social contexts, of course,
and for other employment relationships: individuals sign up for military service all over
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the world, for example, thereby agreeing to be sent somewhere where they might not
choose to go and to engage in a line of work that may prove harmful to them.What makes
the case of surrogacy morally problematic, according to Satz, is the fact that women sign
over authority over their body in a societal context that has traditionally not protected
women’s interest. Instead, it has ‘historically subordinated women’s interest to those of
men, primarily through [. . .] control over women’s sexuality and reproduction.’39 If
women’s interest were represented in the social context, we might in fact convince
ourselves to find some positive sides to surrogacy: ‘in a society in which women’s work
was valued as much as men’s and in which child care was shared equally, pregnancy
contracts [. . .] have the potential to transform the nuclear family.’40
Satz seems to suggest here that surrogacy contracts are not inherently problematic, but
instead that they are problematic in the context of the actual gendered division of labour,
to which in the international context is added the racial and socio-economic aspects.41
The question Satz raises, then, is whether women should be able to employ their
reproductive organs in order to further their own goals, or if this risks entrenching
stereotypical gender structures and increasing women’s vulnerability in a society that
doesn’t have their interests at heart. We should be critical of the conclusion Satz draws
from this though, namely to prohibit surrogacy contracts. While we may share Satz’s
concern that allowing for international surrogacy contracts may perpetuate a gendered
division of labour, prohibition against surrogacy contracts should give us pause, since
prohibition would simply perpetuate another ill, namely the ‘control over women’s
sexuality and reproduction’ she rightly criticises. Prohibition, in other words, would not
protect women from harm in a world that doesn’t have their interest at heart. It would
instead deprive women of one way to engage in contractual labour.
More importantly, and returning to the analytical lens of vulnerability I want to
employ here, we need to ask if a ban on surrogacy contracts would actually address the
kind of vulnerability Satz identifies.This vulnerability takes two forms: first, it is the lack
of representation of women’s interests in society; and second, it is the exposure of their
interest in the contexts of specific contracts. Considering the first kind of vulnerability,
and recalling that vulnerability is a relational notion that assumes an agent to whom one
is vulnerable, we could speculate that women are vulnerable towards men in society.The
harm to women’s interests may be that they see themselves employed as ‘handmaids’,
rather than being considered as equals in society, or as equal partners in their relation-
ships.The question we need to ask, though, is from where this vulnerability derives. If it
comes from carrying out work that they would not have chosen of their own volition,
then the evidence seems to speak against this particular reason for prohibiting surrogacy
contracts: women who describe their experiences as surrogates often report that they like
their work and indeed take pride in it.42 If, on the other hand, the vulnerability derives
from the subordinate socio-economic status women may have in many societies, then it
is not clear how prohibiting one way of elevating their socio-economic status, namely,
surrogacy work, should convince us as a remedy. Put differently, we may wonder if
surrogacy cannot play a different role; we may ask to what extent surrogacy and
reproductive work can’t change women’s position in their society. Against Satz’s blanket
warning, we may point instead towards those women who use surrogacy to improve their
own socio-economic status.
Concerning the second possible source of vulnerability, the conditions of the contract,
we need to look at the interest a contractual right to surrogacy aims to protect.The first
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such interest is of course contractual freedom; a second interest, furthermore, pertains
to the realisation of autonomous goals in life, as I have argued all along.The only possible
way this interest can be protected is if the claims deriving from a right to surrogacy as a
contractual right includes contractual protection.This is to say that such contracts need
to be regulated in a manner in line with the interests motivating the second order interest
of entering into a contract. To accept surrogacy as a contractual right does not neglect
that the interests of the contracting parties give rise to specific claims. For example, and
in order to protect the interests of the surrogate, there may be specific obligations the
commissioning parents need to satisfy to qualify as legitimate contractual partners to
surrogacy agreements: they would have, for instance, specific obligations towards the
surrogate such as paying medical bills, providing for accommodation, food, etc. In turn,
the surrogate may have obligations so as not to sabotage the realisation of the goal of the
contract: she should not sabotage her health, the pregnancy, the welfare of the foetus, to
name but the most obvious ones. Earlier on, I briefly described the kinds of medical
interventions often specified in surrogacy contracts. It is certainly true that current
surrogacy contracts are tailored more to the needs and demands of the commissioning
parents than to those of surrogates: for instance, C-sections are oftentimes imposed on
surrogates to accommodate the commissioning parents’ schedules. Rather than waiting
for contractions to set in, a C-section date allows couples to organise travel and be
present at the birth of the child. Surrogates should have the real possibility to withhold
consent to what many regard as an undue invasion into the pregnancy.43
Both parties, we can say, have claims against each other, and both parties can ask that
the state ensure that the kinds of contracts regulating surrogacy are carefully codified and
implemented. Once we think about the interests at stake, I believe it fair to say that
prohibition of international surrogacy contracts may be too blunt a tool to address the
vulnerability to harm of women’s interests in gendered societies.
(2) Vulnerability to Harm to Sense of Self
The second harm that I would like to consider is that to a surrogate’s sense of self.
This particular worry relates to the kind of work that surrogacy demands. Some argue
that reproductive work in surrogacy alienates a woman from her sense of self.44 This
worry is weighty from a vulnerability and autonomy perspective: vulnerability can be
construed not simply as a harm to interest, as I have done so far. Instead, a specific
kind of vulnerability — what we may refer to as self-negating vulnerability — is char-
acterised by a lack of sense of self. The possibility for such a sense, however, is inti-
mately tied to the definition of individual autonomy that I have assumed so far: it
implies ‘real and effective capacity to develop and pursue [one’s] own conception of a
worthwhile life.’45 To be able to engage in this kind of designing of our own lives, we
need to have a sense of self — we need to know what we stand for, and who we are
in relation to others.46
Now, if we were to accept that surrogacy is justifiable because it is autonomously
chosen, and if we subscribe to the liberal value of autonomy, then it would be problem-
atic if surrogacy turned out to be undermining the conditions of autonomy. If it proved
to be true, in other words, that surrogacy led individual women to negate their sense of
self, their own idea of who they are, then this would be problematic since one of the
conditions for autonomy is to know who we are and what we stand for.47 Then the
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original assumption of surrogacy as a contractual right is void: we can’t defend entering
a contract as being based on autonomous decision making if the decision will undermine
a personal sense of self, thus making any further autonomous decision impossible.This,
we could say, would be analogous to allowing an autonomous decision to sell ourselves
into slavery. Liberals don’t allow such a decision not only because it is irreversible, but
also because it is incoherent.We can’t use autonomy to create conditions of slavery that
render future autonomous decisions impossible.We can hold that in a case like this, the
liberty right to freedom of contract comes to its limits.48 Similarly, it would be incoherent
to employ autonomy to create conditions that undermine the background conditions of
autonomy. If surrogacy were the kind of work that alienated women from their
sense of self, then surrogacy would provoke a specific kind of vulnerability that negates a
sense of self. Our moral obligation would have to be to prevent any such contract from
being drawn up.
Again, I am doubtful, this time not about the remedy, but about the diagnosis.We need
to ask if it is indeed the case that women lose their sense of self when working as
surrogates. The studies referred to earlier attest to the fact that alienation among
surrogates, while not impossible, may at least be as rare or common as alienation from
any other work in the capitalist market economies. It is not clear that work in a garment
factory in Bangladesh provides women with greater or lesser sense of self than surrogate
work. In fact, we may speculate that surrogate work provides women with more pos-
sibilities to develop an extended sense of self and a basis of self-respect, and for two
reasons: first, such work allows them to realise some of their own goals, as I have
proposed before. Moreover, we can imagine that it gives them satisfaction to be able to
help an otherwise childless couple to realise something dear to them. As Pande has
convincingly argued, some surrogates identify as bearers of gifts to the childless.49 It is
not clear why this should jeopardise a positive sense of self.
Instead of bemoaning the self-negating vulnerability that comes from surrogacy work,
then, I want to argue that surrogacy can counter this specific kind of vulnerability because
it may contribute to a positive sense of self that arises in relationships in which we can
realise ourselves. Such self-realisation may happen in two ways: first, recall the value of
parenthood that I have accepted in Section 2. Surely we need to assume that a mother
who is able to provide for her children materially may find satisfaction in her ability to
carry out her parental obligations and her duties of care. In this instance, surrogacy may
foster a positive sense of self for the surrogate not only in relation to the childless couple,
but also in her relationship with her biological children: to be able to provide for them
with the proceeds from the surrogacy contract may be an important aspect of a woman’s
identity and may help her define herself in a meaningful way. If this is accepted, then
I believe that concern for the surrogate’s sense of self, and harm to conditions of
autonomy doesn’t warrant a blanket prohibition.
So far, then, I have argued that a positive sense of self may stem from the newly won
socio-economic status that surrogacy work provides. If surrogacy contracts are regulated
the way it has been proposed elsewhere,50 it is not clear why such work can’t help address
social gender inequalities. Second, much vulnerability can be addressed through careful
regulation and properly enforced implementation of surrogacy contracts. We may also
easily accept that their legitimacy be tied to specific regulations in order to create
conditions of autonomy, since this is the rationale for a right to surrogacy as a contractual
right. One such condition might be that only women with their own biological children
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may be considered for surrogacy contracts. Against those who might hold that such a
requirement constitutes a restriction of the right to access to surrogacy contracts, I
would reply that the condition is justified from a liberal perspective. The fact of having
borne children provides women with necessary knowledge about the work they propose
to undertake. Such knowledge, in other words, creates conditions of autonomy if these
are understood as conditions in which we can give informed consent to an option
before us.
A restriction on who can work as a surrogate is symmetrical to the justifiable restric-
tions concerning who can commission a child. Here, I believe it fair to say that the
interests of the future child have to play a role in assessing who can enter into surrogacy
contracts. We should discuss what kinds of limits we may reasonably motivate against
reproductive freedoms,51 and we should also discuss limits on who can enter into
surrogacy contracts that aim, after all, to bring into existence future children. Framing
the right to surrogacy in this way, in other words, may allow restrictions on who can
become a contracting partner — we may, for instance, stipulate that the very young and
the very old should not be party to such contracts, for concern of the well-being of the
child. These restrictions are not based on the fact that we are restricting surrogacy
arrangements. They are not determined by the fact that the children result from such
contracts. Instead, they are founded in the kinds of restrictions we may want to apply to
all hopeful parents.52
4. Conclusion
International surrogacy is a growing way for childless couples to realise their goal of
biological children. At the same time, the practice provides women especially in devel-
oping countries with access to employment that may allow them to provide for them-
selves and their families. Surrogacy should not be understood as an unfettered right to
assisted procreation, however. This would impose implausible burdens on societies that
otherwise aim to help their members to realise cherished goals of their lives. Instead, a
right to surrogacy can only be conceived as a right to enter surrogacy contracts. If
surrogacy contracts are regulated and implemented with the best interest of the con-
tracting partners and the future child in mind, the right to surrogacy as a right to enter
surrogacy contracts may be defended.
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